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Philip Roessler’s book investigates an important question within the civil war and conflict
literature: what causes civil wars in Africa’s weak states? While many scholars seek to understand
this puzzle, few provide answers as provocative as Roessler’s meso-level theory. Civil wars,
according to Roessler, cannot be understood apart from their relationships to coups d’état. The two
phenomena are manifestations of a security dilemma inherent in weak states. As colonization in
Africa has deeply entrenched ethnic identities, as the foundation of politics, Roessler highlights,
weak states rely on the inherited colonial legacy of patron-client networks for effective governance
of the periphery from the capital. To do so, “big men” in power need to share government resources
with rival ethnic leaders in order to garner the support of the latter’s ethnic base.1
Herein, however, lies the dilemma for political leaders in control of the state: whether to
share or not to share power with their ethnic foes. In the volatile Hobbesian world where the
state is not the only power with monopoly over violence, where political rivals are also “violence
specialists,” political leaders weigh the risks of power-sharing. Sharing government resources with
rival ethnic leaders bolsters their war-making capabilities and increases the probability these rival
networks will try to usurp power via a coup d’état. On the other hand, excluding rivals increases
the probability of the state facing a civil war as it loses control over the periphery where its rivals
are strong.
As such, political foes in weak states are caught in what Roessler calls the coup-civil war trap,
mistrustful of other violence specialists to expect genuine cooperation in a power-sharing scheme,
yet wary enough of a civil war to exclude them. While states tend to risk civil war to eliminate
what they perceive as an imminent threat of coup d’état if it were to share power, under certain
conditions, political rulers can and do choose strategic power-sharing. Africa’s more peaceful
states, like Ghana, Togo, and Benin, according to Roessler, accept power-sharing when the warmaking capabilities of rival ethnic groups (their size or proximity to the capital) are comparable.
When the rival group is either large or strategically located near the capital, the threat of civil war
is so pronounced that leaders must accept the coup threat and share power.
The book brilliantly employs an iterative mixed-method design, demonstrating the richness
of coupling qualitative and quantitative approaches in elucidating complex phenomena such as
civil wars. To develop his theory on ethnopolitical exclusion and power-sharing, Roessler offers a
detailed case-study of Sudan, his exploratory, theory-building case. In Sudan, the National Islamic
Front (NIF) regime had broad political networks that allowed it to quell the Darfur rebellion in the
1990s. In the 2000s, however, the regime dismantled the NIF in order to reduce the chances of a
coup. But this left the regime more susceptible to the 2003 rebellion. Roessler uses the Darfur case
to argue that temporal variation suggests an underlying political logic in which the threat of a coup
leads to actions that increase the chances of large-scale violence.
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Roessler then tests the generalizability of this theory and the hypotheses developed from his
investigation of Sudan using the Ethnic Power Relations dataset and an original dataset. Following
the statistical analyses, which confirm Roessler’s coup-civil war theory, the book tests the model
by offering an in-depth study of the 1998 conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
convincingly illustrating how strategic uncertainty generated the breakdown of power-sharing
and led to what has come to be known as Africa’s Great War.
Ethnic Politics and State Power, however, raises an important unanswered question: how to
escape the coup-civil war trap? The extreme ends of either coup or civil war can be violent and
result in more instability. Their mid-point, peace by accommodation within the confines of the trap,
is similarly unsustainable. A lasting (and positive) peace would be one achieved by dismantling
the trap. How can that be done? Roessler, furthermore, notes Joel Migdal’s idea of Africa’s “strong
societies and weak states.”2 The context of Roessler’s study suggests that these strong societies are
the ethnic networks that undergird political power. Is this what Africa’s strong societies are? Could
these very strong societies that sustain the coup-civil war trap help to break it?
Lastly, having presented an excellent in-depth study of cases illuminating the coup-civil war
trap, the book leaves wanting a similarly worthy investigation of cases to explicate the intricacies
of societal peace through power-sharing. Although the focus on peace through power-sharing may
be secondary to Roessler’s primary theoretical questions of interest, a more detailed case-study
would have only further enriched this section of the book.
In conclusion, Roessler’s work is an exciting and significant contribution to the field of conflict
studies broadly defined. In accessible, well organized, and generously referenced chapters, Roessler
unfolds an innovative and promising theory of civil war that provides students of political violence
in Africa with new theoretical tools and perspectives. The book is also of great value to scholars
focused on other regions, where Roessler’s theory and hypotheses could further be tested. Those
who are methodologically inclined will appreciate the mixed-methods design of the book and the
superb weaving together of qualitative and quantitative data.
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